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Interest Rate Controls — Perspective,
Purpose, and Problems
THROUGHOUT MOST of this nation’s history,
usury laws and other interest rate restrictions have
had little impact on credit flows. In recent years, how-
ever, such restrictions have interfered increasingly
with credit markets. The restrictiveness of legal limits
is being felt over wide areas, as a result of a rapid rise
in market rates of interest to levels that are above ceil-
ings set by usury laws and other government controls.
These restrictions have been ameliorated, however,
as maximum permissible rates payable by banks on
deposits have been increased a number of times dur-
ing the past decade when market rates exceeded their
ceilings.1
In 1957 the Federal Reserve Board, for the first
time since being granted the authority in 1933, in-
creased the maximum permissible rates paid by mem-
ber banks on time and savings deposits. Since 1957,
the Board has increased maximum permissible rates
seven times as market rates have risen.
Interest rate restrictions on funds flowing into finan-
cial agencies, which for many years were applied ex-
clusively to banks, have recently been extended to
include maximum rates payable by some nonbank
financial intermediaries. The 1986 Interest Rate Act
directed the Federal Reserve Board, the Secretary of
the Treasury, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to take
action to reduce interest rates to the extent feasible,
given the prevailing money market and economic
conditions. The Federal Reserve Board was given
the power to set different ceiling rates for different
classes of bank deposits. Exercising this broadened
authority, the Board reduced the maximum rate on
consumer-type certificates of deposit to 5 per cent.
In 1986 the FDIC for the first time set maximum
interest rates for mutual savings banks, and the Home
Loan Bank Board applied dividend restrictions to
the savings and loan associations.
Despite this broadening of restrictions, a large per-
centage of funds has continued to flow through finan-
cial intermediaries in response to supply and demand
lFederal Reserve Bulletin, July 1968, p. A-il. Since Feb-
ruary 1936, maximum rates that may be paid by insured
nonmember banks have been the same as those for mem-
berbanks.
forces. Many financial agencies, such as the farm
credit banks, sales finance companies, and nonfinancial
corporation lenders, remain outside Federal controls
on rates payable, though subject to state usury laws
on rates charged.
Lending rates of banks, savings and loan associa-
tions, and individuals are also subject to state usury
laws, which impose limits which recently have been
below market rates in many states. Although
some areas of free market rates remain, controls are
creating diversions in credit flows. The 6 per cent
limit imposed on commercial bank loans in several
states tends to reduce the flow of commercial bank
credit to customers. Limits at the national level on
rates paid by banks and savings and loan associations
for funds slow the growth rate of these intermediaries.
This article accepts the basic economic premise that
free markets lead to an optimum allocation of re-
sources. It concludes that interferences with normal
credit flows create inefficienciesin the financialmarkets
that have an adverse impact on the distribution of
capital and consumer goods.
Such inefficiencies in resource use can be ex-
plained within the framework of a free market. The
market determines the returns to savers and allocates
loanable funds among borrowers. These returns and
allocations are made on the basis of supply and de-
mand conditions. Supplies of loanable funds are de-
termined by savings and the increments of credit
created by monetary action. Many savers have the
alternative of lending to intermediary savings-type
financial agencies such as banks and savings and loan
firms, or investing directly through equities, loans,
bonds, etc. Expected marginal return is the major
factor determining the volume of savings flows into
the various channels. If interest rates payable by
financial agencies are restricted to levels below the
yields of alternative assets, flows of funds through
them tend to decline. On the other hand, if such
rates are determined by market demand, the flows
supplied will expand with the rising demand for
credit.
Demand for loan funds is a function of the mar-
ginal returns to capital plus the demand by individ-
uals and government for current consumption in ex-
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to purchase funds as long as marginal returns exceed
costs. Efficiency in the financial market is maxi-
mized when the marginal return on funds is equal
for all sectors. The price of funds (interest rate) is
thus the allocator of funds both among the various
sectors —business, government, and consumer — and
among the various demanding units in each sector.
When this allocator is inhihited, an inefficient alloca-
tion of funds occurs.
This article is a survey of interest rate restrictions
in their historical setting, first outlining their ration-
alization as given by contemporaries of ancient, me-
dieval, and modern times, and concluding with a
statement of current reasons for controls, control prob-
lems, and the impact of controls on various sectors
of the economy.
Historical Perspective
Restrictions on interest charges were begun in an-
cient times. Interest payments were observed to in-
crease the wealth of the rich and were believed to
deprive the poor. Controls consisted of both religious
proscriptions and legislation which limited or forbade
interest.2 Theories explaining why interest payments
should be restricted were not well developed, al-
though such payments were criticized by most
philbsophers.
Despite these legal and religious considerations and
the strong antagonism of the philosophers, economic
forces continuously fostered interest charges and pay-
ments. Economic relations had already become too
complicated for gratuitous credit in much of the
ancient world, and legal interest limits generally pre-
vailed in ancient Greece. In the 4th century B.C.,
the Romans condoned and later fully sanctioned in-
terest by the institution of legal rates.3
Follo~vingthe collapse of the Roman Empire, a
reaction occurred with respect to interest payments.
The Christian Middle Ages treated the subject of
interest charges on borrowed money more thoroughly,
but with the same hostility as the earlier pagans.
The exploitation of poor debtors by rich creditors
appeared particularly hateful to the Christian, whose
religion taught him to look upon gentleness and
charity as among the greatest virtues and to think
little of earthly goods. The Church, step by step,
2
Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk, Capital and Interest, \Tolume I,
4th edition, 1921, translated (South Hollaad, Illinois:
Libertarian Press, 1959), p. 10.
3
Sidney Homer, A History of Interest Rates, (New Bruns-
Wick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1963), p. 52.
mamiged to introduce legislation prohibiting interest
payments. Secular legislation finally fell almost en-
tirely under the Church’s influence, and severe inter-
est rate statutes emerged, thus abrogating the more
liberal Roman law.4
Despite the charitable instincts of the Church,
businessmen were generally able to prevent the en-
actment of laws which carried the interest limitation
principle to its ultimate conclusion. Exceptions in-
cluded the privilege of public pawnbrokers, trans-
actions by other types of banks, the indulgence in
usury practices by the Jews, and the payment of
interest without its being written into the contract.
Lending practices which involve hidden interest and
which circumvent legal restrictions are thus not pe-
culiar to the present generation.
By the early 14th century, economic activity had
quickened and personal freedom was on the up-
swing. Although beliefs about interest had not
changed, practical compromises were beginning to
appear. Luther, Zwingli, and other reformers, while
believing that interest was a parasitic gain, consented
to its payment within limits. This practical com-
promise was justified by the argument that interest
could not be conveniently eradicated because man
was considered so imperfect.3
About the middle of the 16th century, students
began to examine the theoretical foundations of severe
interest restrictions. Calvin rejected the scriptural
basis for interest prohibition on the ground that some
passages of Scripture are interpreted differently,
while others are invalid because of changed circum-
stances. He further pointed out the similarity of in-
terest payments to lenders and the use of money to
purchase land on which a return is anticipated.
Nevertheless, he believed in interest rate controls
and adherence to terms established by law. Molinaeus,
a French jurist, went further, refuting point by point
both the pagan and scholastic doctrines of interest
prohibition.° He maintained that the use of money
yields a service, that this service is the “fruit” of
money, and that the lender is injured because of
use foregone.
In the 1700’s, theories related to interest developed
rapidly. Turgot, a French economist, made perhaps
the greatest contribution.7 He carried Calvir’s interest
~Bohm-Bawerk, p. 12.
5fl. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, (New
York: The New American Library of World Literature,
Inc., 1950), p. 18.
CThid., p. 20.
~Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 332.
Page 7analogy a step further, pointing out that money
is the equivalent of a piece of land yielding a certain
percentage of the capital sum. The owner will there-
fore not be inclined to invest his capital in other
enterprises unless he can expect a net return as great
as he would obtain through the purchase of land.8
Turgot also noted that an increase in the quantity
of money which raises commodity prices might in-
crease the rate of interest.0 He thereby pointed to
the possibility of a positive real return on money,
and that price inflation might become imbedded in
the nominal rate of interest.
Following the breakdown of the hard tenets of
scholastic doctrine as a result of economic analysis
and the rising commercial demands for credit in the
1700’s, legal restrictions on the payment of interest
were generally relaxed. Most nations, however, estab-
lished legal maximum usury rates. In 1545 England
repealed the prohibition of interest and replaced it
with a legal rate. The prohibition was later reimposed,
but in 1571 it was again repealed and has never
again been reinstated. The Netherlands yielded to
repeal before 1600, and is an example of a sophisti-
cated economy that developed without the shackles
on interest rates required by the scholastic doctrine.
Germany, with a somewhat slower commercial de-
velopment, repealed the interest prohibition about the
mid-1600’s. Repeal came later in Italy and France
where canonistic influence was more persistent in
both theory and practice.
With the exception of England, laws imposing a
maximum on chargeable interest rates have persisted
in most European countries. In England these
laws, along with other restrictions on commerce and
trade, came under intense pressure in the 1800’s.
Usury laws were suspended entirely in 1830 for bills
under three months’ maturity and were repealed for
all forms of credit in 1854.~°
Early Practices in the United States
Under the influence of the European powers, the
American colonies adopted the traditions of their
homeland with respect to usury. Reasons were ap-
parently unnecessary for the continuance of this ves-
tige of medieval and ancient views. For those who
failed to recognize the limits possible under competi-
tive conditions, restrictions were a compromise be-
tween the necessities of commerce and industry and






rower against exploitation by the “wealthy” lender re-
mained a central core of most usury legislation. Legal
maximums were viewed as a means of restraining
the natural appetite of the lender, and the interest
received was considered a gratuity resulting from the
magnanimous nature of the state. The services per-
formed by capital continued to go unrecognized by
the public.
Most of the early colonies followed the English
custom of establishing a legal maximum of 6 per cent,
a rate that still survives in a number of states. In
most states, however, usury rates have been increased,
and in a few states limits on commercial bank loans
have been completely eliminated (Table 1). Four
of the five states which currently have no maximum
limits, namely Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,
and New Hampshire, were settled early and estab-
lished the low 8 per cent maximum as colonies.
Furthermore, none of the states which developed
later west of the Mississippi River established maxi-
mum interest rates at the relatively low 6 per cent
level.
Later United States Restrictions
In addition to the usury laws, which were a carry-
over from previous ages, many states in the 20th
century set ceilings on the interest rates that banks
could pay on deposits. These ceilings were usually
imposed in connection with deposit insurance pro-
grams. Maximum interest rates permissible for state
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Page 8those paid by national banks. To remedy this situa-
tion, the Federal Reserve Act was amended in 1927,
limiting the rates paid by national banks on time,
savings, and other deposits to the maximum permitted
state banks in the same state.” Following the ensuing
depression of the early 1930’s, the Banking Act of
1933, with little discussion, prohibited member bank
payment of interest on demand deposits and gave
the Federal Reserve Board authority to set max-
imum rates on time and savings deposits for all
member banks. These limitations were extended to
nonmember insured banks by the Banking Act of
1935.
Reasons for interest rate restrictions given during
the hearings related to the Banking Acts of 1933 and
1935 fell into three general categories. First, a reduc-
tion of interest rates payable by banks would tend to
reduce the rates charged to bank customers. Second,
interest restrictions, especially the prohibition of in-
terest on demand deposits, would prevent the move-
ment of funds from smaller to larger communities,
and more funds would remain in the small rural
communities to meet local demands. Third, restrictions
on rates payable would prevent the excessive bidding
up of rates which in turn leads to high-return, high-
risk assets and bank failures.
Dr. Oliver M. W. Sprague, Professor of Banking
and Finance, Harvard University, presented the first
view. Concerning the “need” for lower interest rates,
he said: “. ..I should look for it to be brought about,
more, through the moderate rate of interest that banks
may pay on deposits t2 Marriner Eccles, Chair-
man of the Federal Reserve Board, testified: “Fixing
the maximum rate of interest on deposits tends to
bring down the rate on loans. That is the effect.”3
Similar views were expressed by Senator Smith W.
Brookhart of Iowa, a member of the Committee on
Banking and Currency, and Harry J. Haas, President
of the American Bankers Association.’4
The second view, that the prohibition of interest
on demand deposits prevents the movement of funds
to financial centers, was presented by Senator Carter
Glass of Virginia, Chainnan of the Subcommittee
“Amendment to the Federal Reserve Act, section 24, dated
February 25, 1927 (44 Stat. 1224, ch. 191).
“Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Banking and Currency, United States Senate, Seventy-
fourth Congress, First Session on S-1715, Part I, April 19
to May 13, 1935, p. 217.
“Hearings Before the Committee on Banking and Currency,
House of Representatives, Seventy-fourth Congress, First
Session on H. R. 5357, February 21 to April 8, 1935, p. 330.
‘4Hearings Before the Committee on Banking and Currency,
Seventy-second Congress, First Session on S-4115, Part I,
March 23-25, 1932.
on Monetary Policy, Banking, and Deposit Insurance.
Speaking on the floor of the Senate in 1933, Senator
Glass said: “. ..this payment of interest, particularly
on demand deposits, has resulted in drawing the funds
from country banks to the money centers for spec-
ulative purposes”5 Similar views were expressed by
Congressman Patman of the Committee on Banking
and Currency,’6 and by Ronald Ransom, Vice Chair-
man, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.17
A third thread extending throughout the hearings
prior to the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 was that
interest rate restrictions were essential to prevent the
excessive bidding up of rates, Benjamin M. Andersen,
Jr., economist with the Chase National Bank, said:
“The only place where a definite abuse existed that
needed public regulation was time deposits.” Senator
McAdoo stated: “The bidding by banks against each
other for the deposits of customers who had large
deposits. ..led to unwholesome competition between
banks and an unwholesome condition so far as de-
mand deposits were concerned.”18 Leo T. Crowley,
Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, said: “. ..in years gone by, banks paid as high
as 4, 5, and 6 per cent for what we would term
‘time deposits’. They offered all kinds of premiums,
like blankets and clocks and the banks which per-
haps should not have paid those high interest rates
were the ones that were the most apt to offer the
depositor an interest rate that was not sound.”°
In 1966 a fourth reason for the control of rates
payable on time and savings deposits was developed
— the elimination of unsound competition between
banks and other financial intermediaries. In hearings
on the Interest Rate Act of 1968, excessive competi-
tion was the principal subject of discussion. Norman
Strunk, Executive Vice President of the United States
Savings and Loan League, reported: “The adverse
effect on the flow of savings into savings and loan
associations and savings banks has been severe and
the situation is worsening monthly. Those commer-
“Quoted in Hearings Before the Committee on Banking and
Currency, House of Representatives, Seventy-eighth Con-
gress, Second Session on H. R. 3956, December 10, 1943
to February 9, 1944, p. 2.
‘~Ibid., p. 679.
‘~Ibid., p. 16.
“Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Banking and Currency, United States Senate, Seventy-
fourth Congress, First Session oa S-1715, Part II, May 14-
22, 1935, pp. 490-91.
“Hearings Before the Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, House of Representatives, Seventy-fourth Congress,
First Session on H. R. 5357, February 21 to April 8, 1935,
p. 86.
Page 9cial banks unable or unwilling to compete at the
new rates are equally affected.
“The commercial banks, as short-term lenders with
their funds invested in short-term business loans and
high-interest-rate consumer loans, are able to charge
more in periods of high interest rates, and commercial
hank loans can be adjusted to higher interest rates
more readily. Bank earnings, thus, can increase very
rapidly in periods of rising short-term interest rates,
and banks can pay higher rates on savings.”0 Similar
views were expressed by John E. Horne, Chairman
of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.2’
In addition to the need for restraining competition
between banks and other financial agencies, Larry
Blackmon, President of the National Association of
Home Builders, emphasized the merit of giving first
preference for savings to homeowners.” The need
for at least temporary restraint on competition for
funds was expressed by the Council of Economic
Advisers.23
The Interest Rate Regulation Act of 1986, which
was passed following these hearings, directed the
supervisory authorities to take action to bring about
a reduction of interest rates to the maximum extent
feasible in the light of current money market and
economic conditions. It authorized the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System and the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Coiporation to prescribe dif-
ferent rate limitations for different classes of bank
deposits, and also provided for regulating rates paid
by mutual savings banks and dividends on savings
and loan association shares.
The Effects of Usury Laws
An analysis of reasons for interest restrictions by
ancient, medieval, and modern societies reveals the
heavy influence of ethical and moral considerations,
These considerations were heavily weighed in favor of
low interest rates which were generally believed
obtainable through legislation. The actual impact of
usury legislation, however, probably has been con-
trary to the intended impact. Instead of providing
lower cost credit, such laws have often retarded
credit flows. The result has been a scarcity of credit
available for many vital activities.
‘°Hearings Before the Committee on Banking and Cvi-
rency, Eighty-ninth Congress, Second Session on H. R.




Usury Restrictions Retard Home
Construction
Attempts by states to restrict interest payments
have been frustrated by the interconnection of credit
markets. Low ceiling rates, instead of fostering credit
to the poor and for local economic development, have
fostered the export of capital to other areas, despite
the great demand for credit locally. Harry L. Johnson,
in an article on conditions in Tennessee where low
limits are placed on both usury rates and rates pay-
able by banks, reports: “Among the more immediate
and discernible economic ills which have occurred
in the past and which will he aggravated by unreal-
istic limitations on interest rates are: (1) a decline
in residential building, (2) an increase in the level
of unemployment in construction, (3) a decline in
the sales of building supplies, (4) an outflow of sav-
ings, (5) an increase in the rate of interest and
yields on bonds issued by the State of Tennessee and
its political subdivisions, and (6) increased competi-
tion for Tennessee’s financial resources by out-of-state
individuals and businesses.”~ The maintenance of
low legal maximum rates on commercial loans might
he expected to foster industrial development and
economic growth. Most of the 11 states with the
lowest legal limit (6 per cent), however, are not
noted for wealth and vigor, or for the ease of credit
conditions for the poor. About half of them are lo-
cated in the Appalachian Area.”
Credit for home mortgages is affected adversely
in states with low usury ceilings. In a speech before
the Pennsylvania Bankers Association, Andrew F.
Brimmer, Member of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, pointed out the adverse ef-
fects of low ceiling rates on credit flows into the
home mortgage market. He stated that the reduction
in the supply of funds tends to reduce activity in
home building and the transfer of existing dwellings.26
The total volume of funds for lending is curtailed
in states with low usury rate ceilings. Loanable funds
search for areas of highest returns. Ftmds in low rate
ceiling states tend to move to other states and to
24
See Harry L, Johnson, “An Island Unto Itself,” Tennessee
Survey of Business, the University of Tennessee, Volume
III, No. 7, March 1968.
25
States with the 6 per cent limit as of August 1967 were:
Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont, Vu-
ginia, and West Virginia, Since then some of the above
states have raised their limits.
‘
6
Andrew F. Brimmer, “Statutory Interest Rate Ceilings
and the Availability of Mortgage Funds,” Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia, Supplement to Business Review,
June 1968.
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states cannot effectively compete for savings, as the
limitedreturns on loans do not transmit the free market
signals to savers. The limited volume of funds flowing
into such agencies results in a reduced level of loans.
Credit to Low Income Croups Reduced
Credit is more difficult for low income groups to ob-
tain in states with low usury ceilings. Loanable funds,
when restricted to low interest rates, do not seek
out poor borrowers whose security is less adequate
and whose repayment capacity is limited. Such credit
flows more readily to borrowers with adequate assets
for pledging. These borrowers can demand larger
low-risk loans with handling costs at a minimum.
Consequently, instead of protecting high-risk bor-
rowers from high rates, usury laws actually prevent
those borrowers from acquiring funds, or force them
to seek illegal or less efficient sources.
Venture Credit Impeded
Venture or development credit, which is also
risky, is retarded in states with severe usury laws.
Such credit can only be extended at a higher rate
of interest to offset the higher risk. In states with low
maximum rates, no means to offset high risks are
available. Usury laws are relatively harmless when
market rates are low relative to the legal maximums,
i.e., when the usury rates are not effective. They are
harmful to all concerned when doing the job for
which they were designed — limiting the rates
chargeable.
The volume of credit flowing to low-risk individuals
and well-established businesses may be almost as
great under severe usury restrictions as under free
market conditions, Low usury ceilings prevent other
individuals and firms from effectively bidding for
funds. With the higher risk users in effect excluded
from the market, most funds will probably flow to low-
risk individuals and firms.
Limits on Rates Payable to Savers
Restrict Credit Flows
Lilce usury laws, many restrictions on rates payable
have their roots imbedded in ancient and medieval
thought. For example, the belief that a reduction in
interest rates payable by banks on deposits tends to
reduce rates charged bank customers (and that this
is a worthy objective) implies that low charges to
debtors are preferable to high returns to savers. A
look at the credit market indicates that the rich-
creditor, poor-debtor implications carried over from
the Middle Ages may not hold in modern economies.
The Rich-Creditor, Poor-Debtor Fallacy
Instead of the rich leaving funds in the banks’
custody to loan out to poor borrowers, the reverse
may be closer to the facts, In 1957 more than half of
all member bank business credit was extended to
firms with net worths of $50,000 and over.2’
Investment of savings through banks and savings
and loan associations has not led to the accumulation
of great wealth during the period of national controls
on rates payable. For example, an investment of
$10,000 in 1934 in savings deposits at ceiling rates,
with 75 per cent of earnings reinvested annually,
would have been worth $20,239 in 1967. Similar in-
vestments in Standard and Poor’s composite list of
common stocks and farm land would have been worth
$232,530 and $271,476, respectively. At constant prices
based on the Gross National Product price deflator,
the savings deposit yield was negative, whereas the
investments in common stocks and farm land rose S
and 9 fold, respectively. These data indicate that
great wealth has not been accumulated from savings-
type investments in recent years. On the other hand,
a large proportion of such depositors was in the mid-
dle and lower economic classes and had few alterna-
tive opportunities for investment.
Low Rates to Saveis May
Cause Higher Rates to Rorroweis
In addition to the rich-poor fallacy, the causation
assumed in the “low rates paid to savers lowers rates
to borrowers” argument is questionable. Legal maxi-
mum rates, which are effective in holding rates below
levels that banks and other financial agencies can af-
ford to pay under competitive conditions, tend to re-
duce the flow of funds through normal channels and
to divert savings into non-credit uses such as bonds,
equities, real estate, etc. The smaller supply of funds
moving into the credit market will meet an equal
amount demanded at higher rates. Borrowers must
pay the higher rates to obtain funds. Attempts to
lower the rates to borrowers by limiting their oppor-
tunity to compete for funds is comparable to efforts
to lower food prices by limiting the amount that
farmers can spend on production. Total costs could
27
”Member Bank Lending to Small Business,” Federal Re-
serve Bulletin, April 1958, p. 396.
Page Iibe lowered, but output and consumption would de-
cline, and prices of farm products and food would be
increased.
A reduction in the flow of funds through efficient
financial agencies and the consequent higher prices
retard economic growth. Credit’s contribution to
growth is maximized when scarce credit resources
flow most efficiently to areas where returns are great-
est. Rates offered savers then transmit consumer and
business demands for credit. When market rates ex-
ceed the legal maximum permitted, the appropriate
signal is not transmitted to savers, and flows of funds
are diverted from normal channels. Flows through
the credit market decline and a greater portion of
savings moves into equities, real estate, bonds, and
direct loans. Credit-using activities which comprise a
major part of economic growth are thus retarded.
This diversion of credit flows and the consequent
growth retardation are especially severe in the case of
state restrictions, since funds are not only diverted to
non-credit uses, but to credit uses in surrounding
states.
Market Rates Distribute
Credit to All Areas
The second reason for restricting interest rates pay-
able — that uncontrolled rates paid tend to dry up
loanable funds in rural areas and cause excessive
concentrations of funds in the largest cities — is like-
wise questionable. It was contended that the specula-
tors who borrowed funds in the largest cities
could outbid borrowers in the smaller communities.
Farmers, rural merchants, and other citizens would
thus be without available credit, whereas bountiful
supplies could be found in the large cities available
to the speculators. This conception of the financial
market is not consistent with the facts. The large
financial agencies which gather funds are often lo-
cated in the large centers, but they gather savings
from both rural and urban areas, and under free
market conditions distribute funds to areas where
marginal returns are greatest. Rural areas have dem-
onstrated their ability to compete for funds in na-
tional markets when provided with access to such
markets. The farm credit banks are good examples
of the ability of rural communities to compete for
funds in the money market centers. Commercial banks
likewise gather funds from savers in all areas and
distribute them to areas of greatest marginal returns
insofar as the banking structure permits. In some
instances these distributions are in the form of direct
loans, while in other cases funds are distributed to
ulthnate users through other financial agencies such
as the farm credit banlcs.
Danger of Institutions Failing Overstated
The third argument for restricting rates payable —
that high rates paid on savings force financial insti-
tutions into high-risk investments and ultimate failure
— dates back to the early thirties. Its proponents see
nothing that will serve to break the rise in rates paid
on deposits when banks begin to bid against one
another for funds. It is argued that the banks are com-
pelled to take one imprudent investment step after
another until asset risks reach intolerable levels and
depositors’ funds are ultimately lost. However, little
evidence to confirm this view has been forthcoming.
George Benston found no relationship between in-
terest rates paid on deposits and gross rate of return
on investments.28 He also found no relationship be-
tween average rates paid by banks and average risks
of their portfolios, as measured by ultimate write-offs
of investments. Contrary to the expectations of the
high-rate, high-risk thesis, he found that interest rates
paid were substituted at the margin for other operat-
ing expenses such as salaries, facilities, automated
machinery, advertising, etc.
Profit maximization by banks, as in other firms, pro-
vides a more rational explanation of bank behavior.
Banks are likely to use the same criterion in deciding
what rate of interest to offer as they use in making
other decisions relative to expense. In making deci-
sions on hiring additional workers, they base their
decisions on the expected value of services performed.
They are likely to continue to hire additional help
as long as the gain in value of services exceeds all
costs associated with the additional labor, Marginal
costs and returns, with due allowance for risks, also
determine the level of interest rates that a bank de-
cides to pay. Otherwise, the bank is not maximizing.
Haywood and Linke conclude in a recent publica-
tion that “when stripped of the folklore that has
grown up around it, the relevant rationale of deposit
interest regulation in 1933 was price fixing, which was
somewhat in vogue at the time as an anti-depression
measure.”2’
A Costly Method of Protecting Financial
Intermediaries
A more recent argument given for controlling in-
terest rates payable on deposits at financial inter-
‘
8
George J. Benston, “Interest Payments on Demand Depos-
its and Bank Investment Behavior,” Jourmil of Political
Economy, October 1964, pp. 431-449.
“Charles F. Haywood and Charles M. Linke, The Regnla-
tion of Deposit Interest Rates, a study prepared for the
Trustees of the Banking Research Fund, Association of
Reserve City Bankers, (Chicago, Illinois: June 15, 1968),
p. 3.
Page 12mediaries is that sizable increases in rates paid Rate controls may have been the most important
may cause substantial hardship to savings and loan
associations. In addition to destructive internal com-
petition, destructive external competition has become
a reason for restricting rates payable. It is contended
that hardships would be especially severe on savings
and loan associations because of the long-term nature
of their assets and the short-run contracts on funds
purchased. The average interest rate paid on all de-
posits rises immediately as rates offered increase,
whereas returns increase only on new mortgage ad-
ditions to the portfolio. Average earnings thus rise
much more slowly than expenses.
The need for rate controls for this purpose may
be questioned. The book value of aggregate reserves
and undivided profits of savings and loan institutions
is currently nearly twice the size of their yearly
dividend payments. They also have cash and govern-
ment security holdings from which payments could
be made totaling over double their yearly dividend
payments. These ratios prevailed even at the end of
1966, after the associations had endured their most
adverse year. This means that the average association
could remain solvent in an accounting sense and pay
its dividends for nearly two years, even though it
had no net profits.8°
Investing on a long-term basis with short-term
funds apparently calls for a substantial amount of
liquidity. Such liquidity can be either in the form
of short-term loans or other short-term assets, such
as government bonds, etc. If changes in savings and
loan restrictions are necessary to provide greater
liquidity, such changes are preferable to rate rigidities
which deprive the community of the benefits of rate
competition. Furthermore, other opportunities, such
as maximum assistance from the Federal home loan
banks during periods of stress, have apparently not
been fully exploited. With 12 to 15 per cent of the
portfolios of savings and loan associations turning
over each year, assistance from the Home Loan Bank,
coupled with a permissible reduction in reserves,
should take care of most periods of interest rate rises
for the major portion of savings and loan associations.
These associations have considerable ability to with-
stand these periods when terms of trade are adverse.
Furthermore, on the downside of interest rates, rapid
accumulations of reserves can be made, offsetting
losses on the upside of rate movements, and the Home
Loan Bank can be repaid and reserves recouped.
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factor contributing to the slowdown in the housing
industry during the recent periods of sharply rising
general interest rates. Rising rates make yields on
saving accounts at controlled levels less attractive
than rates paid in the free market. There have been
several setbacks in the rate of increase of savings
capital of these institutions during periods of rela-
tively high or rising interest rates, In only one quarter,
however, (third quarter, 1966, during which rate
controls were put into effect) was there a moderate
net decline, To the extent that rate controls reduced
credit flows into the savings and loan industry, they
affected bousing adversely.
Appropriate monetary and fiscal policies are also
important factors in maintaining the stability of sav-
ings and loan associations. Sharp increases in interest
rates during recent years have been associated with
rising prices. The real rate of return on loans and
investments has been relatively stable. The rising
prices can be ~associated with expansive fiscal and
monetary actions. Thus, an important factor in main-
taining relatively stable interest rates is the mainte-
nance of fiscal and monetary policies that are condu-
cive to stable prices.
If, as a final resort, other means are necessary to pre-
vent widespread failures in savings and loan associa-
tions, direct Government loans through the Federal
Home Loan Bank System are preferable to interest
rate controls, Such assistance could be givenonly to the
weak associations which had not adequately pre-
pared for adverse economic conditions. In contrast
to helping only the weak, rate controls widen the
spread for all associations, and prevent rate competi-
tion within the banking community, and between
savings and loan associations and banks. Thus, the
public loses the benefit of rate competition and at the
same time loses the benefit of the potential growth of
both associations and banks during periods of sharply
rising rates.
A major effect of rate controls is the limitation of
the size of controlled firms, which in turn causes a
more rapid growth in flows of funds which are not
controlled. Rate restrictions thus may not be profitable
to the agencies restricted. With the slower growth
rate, bank earnings are likely to be less over the
longer run, and savings and loan associations will
perform a declining function in the economy. The
rapid growth of farm credit at the farm credit banks
relative to commercial banks in the past two years
may illustrate this situation. Farm credit outstanding
at production credit associations and Federal land
Page 13banks rose at almost double the rate of farm credit
expansion at commercial banks from 1965 to 1967.
Summary
Restrictions on interest rates charged and paid by
competitive financial institutions are vestiges of me-
dieval and ancient thought, and are inapplicable to
modern commercial economies, They are based on
false premises, operate perversely, and are economi-
cally inefficient.
The ancients banned interest for ethical reasons,
the medievals for religious and moral considerations;
modern restrictions are a carry-over of such ideas
plus a lack of confidence in market forces. Supply
and demand for loan funds rather than rate controls
historically have kept interest rates at moderate levels
in the United States.
Ancient and medieval desires to improve the posi-
tion of poor debtors relative to rich creditors may
have had some basis. There is no evidence today,
however, that borrowers from financial institutions are
less wealthy than their saving depositors. A floor un-
der rates paid might be more helpful to the poor than
a ceiling. Usury ceilings eliminate the poor higher-
risk borrowers from the credit market and thereby
channel a higher percentage of loanable funds to
lower-risk customers. Consequently, any alteration of
rich-poor relationships made by low usury ceilings is
likely to he in favor of the wealthy.
All ceilings which alter normal flows of funds re-
tard economic growth. Low usury ceilings prohibit
the higher rates necessary to offset the higher risks
of business and individual innovators. Credit tends
to be channeled into well-established, low-risk func-
tions. Low ceilings on rates payable by financial
agencies tend to restrict the flow of funds through
usual credit channels. Loan fund supplies are thereby
reduced, affecting borrowers adversely. Such restric-
tions are especially harmful to long-term credit users,
such as the housing industry, where credit is the
major source of purchase money and interest an fin-
portant part of the total costs.
The thesis that high rates paid cause institutions
to invest in high-risk assets has little validity. Instead
of contributing to imprudent banking practices, high
rates may indicate flexibility and competitiveness in
meeting the sound credit demands of the community.
Bank failures result from numerous factors, both in-
ternal and external. External factors such as monetary
and fiscal policies and regional economic conditions
may result in deposit drains and loan losses. These
factors were probably the major cause of the failures
in the 1930’s which led to rate ceilings. In any event,
evidence indicates that when low legal limits are set
on rates payable, banks substitute other expenses at
the margin, such as advertising, attractive buildings,
and gifts, where such substitutions are profitable.
The more recent reason for controls — that rate
competition creates excessive hardships for savings
and loan associations — is likewise difficult to uphold.
It implies that a wider profit margin for banks is
necessary to keep funds flowing through the savings
and loan associations into the home building industry.
This wider margin for banks was established despite
the fact that bank failures were almost at the zero
level. This type of assistance protects both the strong
and the weak, inhibits price competition between
the two types of firms and among firms within each
group, and diverts funds to less desirable uses.
Greater liquidity in the form of more short-term
assets is apparently necessary for a number of sav-
ings and loan associations. Some increase in such
assets will permit the associations to weather most
sharp increases in rates without excessive strain.
If some assistance is necessary for savings and loan
associations, a reduction in price competition appears
to be an extremely expensive type of aid. Greater
assistance to the weaker associations through the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank System would appear more
appropriate.
Monetary and fiscal policies which contribute to
greater price stability should alleviate most requests
for assistance by savings and loan associations. Such
policies will reduce the rate of inflation, which in
turn is incorporated into interest rates, thus moder-
ating rate increases.
Finally, controls on rates payable by financial
agencies ignore the welfare of savers who invest
through these agencies. Such savers perform a vital
function in the economy. Rate controls deny many
low income savers the right to a competitive loanable
funds market. High income savers can bypass the
controlled market by investing in equities, etc., but
if rate controls cause them to divert funds or to lose
interest income, their contribution to economic prod-
uct is reduced.
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